A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets – was published by Ata Atay and Marina Núñez in Mathematical Social Sciences
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K0.11-12 Róbert SOMOGYI: Prioritization vs Zero-rating: Discrimination on the Internet Abstract: This paper analyzes two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K0.11-12 Anna Adamecz-Volgyi, Nikki Shure, Morag Henderson3, (Department of Social Science, UCL Institute of Education) Is ‘first in family’ a good indicator for widening university participation? ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K0.11-12 István KÓNYA, Judit KREKÓ, Gábor OBLATH Labor shares in the EU sectoral effects and the role of relative prices The paper studies the labor ... Details »
Imre FERTŐ: “The duration of the EU agri-food trade” and Zoltán BAKUCS: “Agglomeration and Spillover Effects of Regional Development Programs” were presented by our collegues at the Agricultural ... Details »
“Vulnerable groups on the labour market – determinants and consequences of economic vulnerability across Europe” was presented by Judit KÁLMÁN at the InGRID-2 Spring ... Details »
“STI policies and framework conditions for innovation” was presented by Attila HAVAS at the CNAM “Actualité de Jean-Jacques Salomon” workshop in Paris. Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitterGoogle