Optimal Income Taxation with Asset Accumulation

Árpád Ábrahám,∗ Sébastian Koehne,† and Nicola Pavoni‡

WORK IN PROGRESS
6 May 2010

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of capital taxation on the shape of labor income taxes. We consider a two-period model of social insurance. By exerting effort, agents can influence their labor income realizations. Moreover, agents can use a risk-free bond for intertemporal self-insurance. We show that the planner’s trade-offs in designing optimal effort incentives depend crucially on the tax rate on bond returns. Through this channel, taxing the bond affects the structure of optimal labor income taxes. Specifically, when agents have preferences with convex absolute risk-aversion, we find that taxing the bond leads to more progressivity of optimal marginal tax rates on labor income.

Keywords: Income Taxation, Asset Accumulation, Progressivity.

JEL: D82, D86, E21, H21.

1 Introduction

The progressivity of the income tax code is a central question in the economic literature and the public debate. While we observe progressive tax systems in most developed countries nowadays,

∗European University Institute, Florence. E-mail address: Arpad.Abraham@EUI.eu
†University of Mannheim. E-mail address: skoehne@mail.uni-mannheim.de
‡University College London, IFS, and CEPR. E-mail address: n.pavoni@ucl.ac.uk
theoretical insights on progressivity are rather limited. Previous research has examined how the optimal degree of progressivity depends on the skill distribution (Mirrlees 1971), the welfare criterion (Sadka 1976), and earnings elasticities (Saez 2001).

The existing approaches to income tax progressivity have largely focused on models where labor is the only source of income. However, we argue in the present paper that the optimal shape of labor income taxes cannot be determined in isolation from the tax code on capital income. Specifically, we show that taxing capital has an important effect on the optimal progressivity of labor income taxes: When capital is taxed, the optimal tax on labor income becomes more progressive.

We derive this result in a two-period model of social insurance. A continuum of ex-ante identical agents influence their labor incomes by exerting effort. Labor income realizations are not perfectly controllable, which creates a moral hazard problem. Thus, the social planner faces a trade-off between insuring the agents against idiosyncratic income uncertainty on the one hand and the associated disincentive effects on the other hand. In addition, agents have access to a risk-free bond, which gives them a limited means for self-insurance.

There is an efficiency reason for taxing bond returns in our model: The bond provides insurance against the realization of labor income and thereby reduces the incentives to exert effort. Consequently, the planner faces an additional constraint when determining the optimal social insurance scheme, since she has to satisfy the agent’s Euler equation. If the bond is appropriately taxed, however, the constraint becomes non-binding. Through this channel, taxing the bond affects the structure of optimal labor income taxes. More precisely, if the bond is not taxed, the planner needs to consider how the distribution of after-tax income changes the agent’s saving motive in the previous period. We show that, for a given income level, a local reduction in the tax rate affects the agent’s saving motive according to his coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Since absolute risk aversion is typically a convex function, we find that optimal after-tax income changes in a more convex way with labor income when bond returns are not taxed. Equivalently, optimal after-tax income changes in a more concave way when the bond is taxed, which means that the tax on labor income becomes more progressive.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines how capital taxation affects the
optimal progressivity of the labor income tax code. Recent work on dynamic Mirrleesian taxation models has highlighted a somewhat complementary question. Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) focus on the optimal taxation of capital, given nonlinear taxation of income. In that literature, the reason for capital taxation is similar to our model and stems from disincentive effects associated with the accumulation of wealth.¹

While the Mirrlees (1971) framework focuses on redistribution in a population with heterogeneous skills, our approach highlights the social insurance (or ex-post redistribution) aspect of income taxation. In spirit, our model is therefore closer to the works by Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980). The main reason for excluding ex-ante redistribution in the present paper is tractability. Conesa and Krueger (2006) study optimal taxation numerically when both redistribution and social insurance motives are present. However, they consider a restricted class of tax schemes. In particular, they do not distinguish between the taxation of labor income and capital. The present model is simpler in some dimensions, but allows us to analytically explore the fully optimal tax scheme.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 presents the main result of the paper: Capital taxation increases the progressivity of the optimal income tax code. In Section 4, we explore alternative concepts of concavity/progressivity. Section 5 concludes and discusses some directions for future research.

2 Model

Consider a benevolent social planner (the principal) whose objective is to maximize the welfare of the citizens. The (small open) economy contains a continuum of ex-ante identical agents who live for two periods, \( t = 0, 1 \), and can influence their date-1 income realizations by working hard or shirking. The planner offers a tax/transfer system to insure them against idiosyncratic risk and provide them

¹However, the tax on capital takes a much simpler form in our model: a linear tax on the aggregate trade of the bond is sufficient to implement the second best; compare Gottardi and Pavoni (2010). Notice, in particular, that this tax can be implemented in an anonymous asset market where the planner only observes the aggregate trading volume.
appropriate incentives for working hard. The planner’s budget must be (intertemporally) balanced.

**Preferences** The agent derives utility from consumption \( c_t \geq c \geq -\infty \) and effort \( \infty \geq e_t \geq \) \( e_t \geq 0 \) according to: \( u(c_t) - v(e_t) \), where both \( u \) and \( v \) are strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable functions, and \( u \) is strictly concave whereas \( v \) is convex. We normalize \( v(0) = 0 \). The agent’s discount factor is denoted by \( \beta > 0 \).

**Production and endowments** At date \( t = 0 \), the agent has a fixed endowment \( y_0 \). At date \( t = 1 \), the agent has a stochastic income \( y \in Y := [\underline{y}, \bar{y}] \). The realization of \( y \) is publicly observable, while the probability distribution over \( Y \) is affected by the agent’s unobservable effort level \( e_0 \) that is exerted at \( t = 0 \). The probability density of this distribution is given by the smooth function \( f(y, e_0) \). As in most of the the optimal contracting literature, we assume full support, that is \( f(y, e_0) > 0 \) for all \( y, e_0 \). There is no production or any other action at \( t \geq 2 \).

**Markets** At each date, the agent can buy or (short)-sell a risk-free bond \( b_t \) which costs \( q \geq 0 \) consumption units today and pays one unit of consumption tomorrow. The agent has no access to any insurance market other than that delivered by the planner. The planner can impose a linear tax \( \tau^k \) on the price of the bond.\(^2\) Therefore, the net price of the bond is \( \tilde{q} = (1 + \tau^k)q \).

There are two ways of motivating the linearity assumption of the tax \( \tau^k \). First, the planner only needs to observe the aggregate trade of the bond in order to implement such a tax. Therefore, the tax is feasible even in an anonymous market where individual asset decisions and consumption levels are private information. Second, linearity is in fact without loss of generality in the present model, since the planner is able to generate the second best with such a tax (see Proposition 1).

Given the structure of the problem, the agent will never be able to borrow at \( t = 1 \), hence we have \( b_1 \geq 0 \). Monotonicity of preferences guarantees that the agent will not want to leave any positive amount of assets at date 1 either. So, \( b_1 = 0 \) for all states \( y \). Similarly, since \( v \) is strictly increasing, \( c_1 = 0 \) for all states \( y \).

\(^2\)A tax on the bond price is equivalent to a tax on the return in our model.
Contracts  A contract $W := (T, \tau^k, e_0, b_0)$ consists of a tax/transfer scheme $T$, a tax rate on the bond $\tau^k$, and choices $(e_0, b_0)$. The tax/transfer scheme $T := (T_0, T(\cdot))$ has two components: $T_0$ denotes the transfer the individual receives in period $t = 0$, and $T(y), y \in Y$, denotes the transfer the individual receives in period $t = 1$ conditional on income realization $y$.

Given a contract $W$, the agent’s utility is

$$U(e_0, b_0; T, \tau^k) := u(y_0 + T_0 - (1 + \tau^k)qb_0) - v(e_0) + \beta \int_y u(y + T(y) + b_0) f(y, e_0) dy.$$  

To guarantee solvency of the agent for every contingency, we impose the ‘natural’ borrowing limit: $b_0 \geq c - \inf_y \{y + T(y)\}$.

The social planner faces the same credit market as the agent, therefore her discount rate is $q$. The planner’s expenditures are

$$T_0 + q \int_y T(y) f(y, e_0) dy - \tau^k q b_0 + G,$$

where $G$ denotes government consumption.

Efficiency  An optimal contract is a contract that maximizes ex-ante welfare

$$\max_{W} U(e_0, b_0; T, \tau^k)$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

subject to the planner’s budget constraint

$$-T_0 - q \int_y T(y) f(y, e_0) dy + \tau^k q b_0 - G \geq 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

and the incentive compatibility constraint

$$(e_0, b_0) \in \arg \left\{ \max_{e,b} U(e, b; T, \tau^k) \text{ s.t. } e \geq 0, y_0 + T_0 - c \geq \bar{q} b \geq -\bar{q} \inf_y \{y + T(y) - c\} \right\}.  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

Note that there is indeterminacy in the contract between $T_0$ and $b_0$. The planner can implement the same allocation with a contract

$$\left(T_0, T(\cdot), \tau^k, e_0, b_0\right)$$

and with a contract

$$\left(T_0 - \bar{q} \varepsilon, T(\cdot) + \varepsilon, \tau^k, e_0, b_0 - \varepsilon\right).$$
In other words, since the planner and the agent face the same credit market, there is a continuum of optimal contracts. Throughout this paper, without loss of generality, we will study the one specific optimal contract that implements \( b_0 = 0 \). Because of these observations, we will sometimes refer to the combination of \( e_0, \tau^k, \) and \( c = (c_0, c(\cdot)) \), with \( c_0 := y_0 + T_0, \ c(y) := y + T(y), \ y \in Y, \) as a contract.

**First-order approach** Throughout this paper, we assume that the first-order approach (FOA) is justified. Hence, we can replace the incentive constraint (3) by the first-order conditions of the agent’s maximization problem with respect to \( e_0 \) and \( b_0 \). Sufficient conditions for the validity of the FOA in this setup are given in Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2010). Specifically, the FOA is valid if the agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion and the cumulative distribution function of income is log-convex in effort.\(^3\)

Using the normalization \( b_0 = 0 \) and the notation \( \tilde{q} = (1 + \tau^k)q, \ c_0 = y_0 + T_0, \ c(y) = y + T(y), \ y \in Y, \) we can thus rewrite the planner’s problem as

\[
\max_{c, \tilde{q}, e_0} \ u(c_0) - v(e_0) + \beta \int_{y}^{\tilde{q}} u(c(y)) f(y, e_0) \, dy
\]

subject to \( c_0 \geq c, \ c(y) \geq c, \ c_0 \geq 0, \) the planner’s budget constraint

\[
y_0 - c_0 + q \int_{y}^{\tilde{q}} (y - c(y)) f(y, e_0) \, dy - G \geq 0 \quad (5)
\]

and the first-order incentive conditions

\[
-v'(e_0) + \beta \int_{y}^{\tilde{q}} u'(c(y)) f_c(y, e_0) \, dy \geq 0 \quad (6)
\]

\[
\tilde{q}u'(c_0) - \beta \int_{y}^{\tilde{q}} u'(c(y)) f(y, e_0) \, dy \geq 0. \quad (7)
\]

---

\(^3\)As argued by Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2010), both conditions have quite a broad empirical support. First, virtually all estimations for \( u \) reveal NIARA; see Guiso et al. (2001) for example. Second, while the condition on the distribution function cannot be taken to the data directly, the authors show that it can be interpreted as a restriction on the agent’s Frisch elasticity of labor supply. This restriction is satisfied as long as the Frisch elasticity is smaller than unity. In fact, most empirical studies find values of this elasticity between 0 and 0.5; see Domeij and Floden (2006), for instance.
Under mild assumptions, the optimal contract is interior: \( c_0 > c; c(y) > c; e_0 > 0 \). In this case, using \( \lambda, \mu \) and \( \xi \) as the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (5), (6), (7), respectively, the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to consumption are

\[
\frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c(y))} = 1 + \mu \frac{f_e(y, e_0)}{f(y, e_0)} + \xi a(c(y)), \quad y \in [y, \overline{y}], \tag{8}
\]

\[
\frac{\lambda}{u'(c_0)} = 1 - \xi \tilde{q} a(c_0), \tag{9}
\]

where \( a(c) := -u''(c)/u'(c) \) denotes the agent’s absolute risk aversion.

**Preliminary characterization of optimal contracts**  Because of the incentive problem, it is efficient to impose a positive tax on savings in our model; compare Gottardi and Pavoni (2010).

**Proposition 1** Assume that the FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is interior. Then the tax on savings is positive: \( \tau^k > 0 \). Moreover, equations (8) and (9) characterizing the consumption scheme are satisfied with \( \xi = 0 \).

**Proof.** See Gottardi and Pavoni (2010). Q.E.D.

The above result is intuitive. It is efficient to tax the bond, because saving provides insurance against the incentive scheme. By appropriately reducing the rate of return, however, the planner can control the agent’s intertemporal decision and therefore circumvent the (first-order) incentive constraint for saving.\(^5\) Consequently, when savings can be taxed, condition (8) takes the form that is familiar from dynamic moral hazard models without asset accumulation:

\[
\frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c(y))} = 1 + \mu \frac{f_e(y, e_0)}{f(y, e_0)}, \quad y \in [y, \overline{y}].
\]

Since we are interested in understanding how the shape of optimal consumption depends on the possibility of taxing savings, we contrast the optimal contract when \( \tau^k \) is a choice variable for the planner with the optimal contract when \( \tau^k \) is restricted to zero (i.e., \( \tilde{q} = q \)).

\(^4\)A sufficient condition for interiority is \( \lim_{c \to \infty} u'(c) = \infty, v'(0) = 0 \).

\(^5\)The validity of the first-order approach is crucial here, since it allows to characterize the agent’s saving decision exclusively based on the rate of return.
Proposition 2 Consider the above problem with \( \tau^k \) restricted to zero. Assume that the FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is interior. Then equations (8) and (9) characterizing the consumption scheme are satisfied with \( \xi > 0 \).

**Proof.** If \( \xi > 0 \), we are done. If \( \xi = 0 \), then the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian read

\[
\frac{\lambda}{u'(c_0)} = 1, \\
\frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c(y))} = 1 + \mu \frac{f_x(y, e_0)}{f(y, e_0)}, \quad y \in [y, \overline{y}].
\]

Since \( f(y, e) \) is a density, integration of the last line yields

\[
\int_{y}^{\overline{y}} \frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c(y))} f(y, e_0) dy = 1.
\]

As a consequence, we obtain

\[
\frac{\lambda}{u'(c_0)} = \int_{y}^{\overline{y}} \frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c(y))} f(y, e_0) dy \geq \frac{\lambda q}{\beta \int_{y}^{\overline{y}} u'(c(y)) f(y, e_0) dy},
\]

where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. The inequality is in fact strict, since the agent cannot be fully insured when effort is interior. Hence, we conclude

\[
\lambda \beta \int_{y}^{\overline{y}} u'(c(y)) f(y, e_0) dy > \lambda q u'(c_0).
\]

For \( \tau^k = 0 \), we have \( q = \tilde{q} \), however. Therefore, the above inequality is incompatible with the agent’s Euler equation (7). This shows that \( \xi \) cannot be zero. **Q.E.D.**

3 Simple results

We are interested in the shape of the optimal tax/transfer scheme \( T \). Clearly, this shape is closely related to the curvature of consumption \( c(y) = y + T(y) \). Recall that we can fix \( b_0 = 0 \) without loss of generality.

**Definition 1** We say that the transfer scheme \( T \) is **progressive** (regressive) if \( c'(y) \) is decreasing (increasing) in \( y \). We call \( T \) **proportional** if \( c'(y) \) is constant in \( y \).
This definition implies that whenever consumption is a concave (convex) function of income we have a progressive (regressive) tax system supporting it. In terms of the taxes and transfers $T(y)$, in a progressive system taxes ($T(y) < 0$) are increasing faster than income does. At the same time, for the states when the agent is receiving a transfer ($T(y) > 0$), transfers are increasing slower than income is decreasing. The opposite happens when we have a regressive scheme. Intuitively, if the scheme is progressive, incentives are provided more by imposing ‘large penalties’ for low income realizations, since consumption decreases relatively quickly when income decreases. Regressive schemes, by contrast, put more emphasis on rewards for high income levels than punishments for low income levels. If the scheme is proportional, these rewards and punishments are in some sense balanced. The next proposition provides conditions for progressivity and regressivity of the optimal scheme.

**Proposition 3 (Sufficient conditions for progressivity/regressivity)** Assume that the FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is interior.

(i) If the likelihood ratio function $l(y, e) := \frac{f(y, e)}{f(y,e_0)}$ is concave in $y$ and $\frac{1}{u'(c)}$ is convex in $c$, then $T$ is progressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion $a(c)$ is decreasing and concave,\(^6\) then this result continues to hold when $\tau^k$ is restricted to zero.

(ii) On the other hand, if $l(y, e)$ is convex in $y$ and $\frac{1}{u'(c)}$ is concave in $c$, then $T$ is regressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion $a(c)$ is decreasing and convex, then this result continues to hold when $\tau^k$ is restricted to zero.

**Proof.** We only show (i), since statement (ii) can be seen analogously. Define

$$g(c) := \frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c)} - \xi a(c).$$

Notice that $\frac{1}{u'(c)}$ is always increasing. Therefore, if $\frac{1}{u'(c)}$ is convex and $\xi = 0$ (or $\xi > 0$ and $a(\cdot)$ decreasing and concave), then $g(\cdot)$ is increasing and convex. Given the validity of the FOA, Proposition 1 (Proposition 2) shows that optimal consumption is defined as follows:

$$g(c(y)) = 1 + \mu l(y, e_0),$$

\(^6\)Notice that absolute risk aversion is bounded below by zero. Therefore, the function $a(\cdot)$ can only be decreasing and concave over $[0, \infty)$ if it is constant.
where, by assumption, the right-hand side is a positive affine transformation of a concave function. By applying the inverse function of \( g(\cdot) \) to both sides, we see that \( c(\cdot) \) is concave since it is an increasing and concave transformation of a concave function. **Q.E.D.**

Note that in the previous proposition, since the function \( g \) is increasing, consumption is increasing as long as the likelihood ratio function \( l(y,e) \) is increasing in \( y \).

Proposition 3 implies that CARA utilities with concave likelihood ratios lead to progressive schemes, no matter whether savings are taxed or not.\(^7\) When savings are taxed, progressive schemes are also induced by concave likelihood ratios and CRRA utilities with \( \sigma \geq 1 \), since \( \frac{1}{u'(c)} = c^\sigma \) is convex in this case. For logarithmic utility with linear likelihood ratios we obtain a scheme that is **proportional**, since \( \frac{1}{\sigma u'(c)} = c \) is both concave and convex. Interestingly, when savings are not taxed, the scheme becomes **regressive** in this case (since absolute risk aversion \( a(c) = \frac{1}{c} \) is convex).\(^8\) This particular finding sheds light on a more general pattern under convex absolute risk aversion: when savings are taxed, the allocation has a ‘more concave’ relationship between income and consumption. In other words, taxing savings calls for more progressivity in the income tax/transfer system. The next result formalizes this insight.

**Proposition 4 (Concavity)** Assume that the FOA is justified. Let \( c \) be an interior, monotonic optimal consumption scheme for the general model and let \( \hat{c} \) be an interior, monotonic optimal consumption scheme for the model when \( \tau_k \) is restricted to zero, both implementing effort level \( e_0 \). Moreover, assume that \( u \) has convex absolute risk aversion and that the likelihood ratio \( l(y,e) \) is linear in \( y \). Under these conditions, if \( \hat{c} \) changes with \( y \) in a concave way, then \( c \) does as well.

\(^7\)Other cases where the tax on savings does not affect regressivity/progresivity are when \( a \) has the same shape as \( \frac{1}{\sigma} \) (quadratic utility) and when \( a \) is linear (and hence increasing).

\(^8\)More precisely, consumption is characterized by \( \frac{M}{\sigma} c(y) - \frac{\xi}{u'(y)} = 1 + \mu l(y,e) \) in this case. Since the left-hand side is concave in \( c \) and the right-hand side is linear in \( y \), the consumption scheme \( c(y) \) must be convex in \( y \).
**Proof.** Given validity of the FOA, \( c(y) \) and \( \hat{c}(y) \) are defined as follows (see Propositions 1 and 2):

\[
g_\lambda (c(y)) = 1 + \mu l(y, e_0), \text{ where } g_\lambda(c) := \frac{\lambda q}{\beta' u(c)}, \tag{10}
\]

\[
\hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi} (\hat{c}(y)) = 1 + \hat{\mu} l(y, e_0), \text{ where } \hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi}(c) := \frac{\hat{\lambda} q}{\beta' u(c)} - \hat{\xi} a(c), \text{ with } \hat{\xi} > 0. \tag{11}
\]

Since \( l(y, e) \) is linear in \( y \) by assumption, concavity of \( \hat{c} \) is equivalent to convexity of \( \hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi} \). Moreover, since \( a(c) \) is convex in \( c \) by assumption, convexity of \( \hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi} \) implies convexity of \( g_\lambda = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi} + \hat{\xi} a \right) \).

Finally, notice that convexity of \( g_\lambda \) is equivalent to concavity of \( c \), since \( l(y, e) \) is linear in \( y \). \textbf{Q.E.D.}

In order to obtain a clearer intuition of this result, we further examine condition (8), namely

\[
\frac{\lambda q}{\beta' u(c(y))} = 1 + \mu \left( \frac{f_e(y, e_0)}{f(y, e_0)} \right) + \xi a(c(y)).
\]

This expression equates the discounted present value (normalized by \( f(y, e_0) \)) of the costs and benefits of increasing the agent’s utility by one unit in state \( y \). The increase in utility costs \( \frac{\lambda q}{\beta' u(c(y))} \) units in consumption terms. Multiplied by the shadow price of resources \( \lambda \), we obtain the left-hand side of the above expression. In terms of benefits, first of all, since the agent’s utility is increased by one unit, there is a return of 1. Furthermore, increasing the agent’s utility also relaxes the incentive constraint for effort, generating a return of \( \mu \frac{f_e(y, e_0)}{f(y, e_0)} \). Finally, by increasing \( u(c(y)) \) the planner alleviates the saving motives of the agent. This gain, measured by \( \xi a(c(y)) \), depends crucially on whether savings are taxed or not. When savings are appropriately taxed, we have \( \xi = 0 \) and this gain vanishes. Intuitively, by controlling the net price of the bond, the planner is able to circumvent the incentive constraint for saving. However, when a tax on savings is ruled out, this constraint is binding and we have \( \xi > 0 \). Under convex absolute risk aversion, the gain \( \xi a(c(y)) \) is convex. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the benefits of increasing the agent’s utility change in a more convex way with income. As a consequence, at the optimal contract the costs of increasing the agent’s utility must also change in a more convex way with income, hence consumption becomes more convex in \( y \) in this case.

\[9\] Of course, if the increase in consumption is done in a state with a negative likelihood ratio, this represents a cost since the incentive constraint is in fact tightened.
4 More elaborate results

Since at least Holmstrom (1979), it is well understood that consumption patterns under moral hazard are crucially influenced by the shape of the likelihood ratio function $l(\cdot, e)$. Stated in more negative terms, one can always find functions $l(\cdot, e)$ so that the shape of consumption is almost arbitrary. To make the impact of the savings tax on the shape of optimal consumption easier to observe, we have therefore normalized the curvature of the likelihood ratio by assuming linearity in Proposition 4.

In this section, we study how the savings tax changes the curvature of the consumption scheme for arbitrary likelihood ratio functions. As usual, we assume that the FOA is justified and that $c$ and $\hat{c}$ are interior, monotonic optimal contracts for the general model and the model without the savings tax, respectively, implementing the same effort level $e_0$.

Probably the most well known ranking in terms of concavity in economics is that dictated by concave transformations (e.g., Gollier 2001).

**Definition 2** We say that $f_1$ is a concave (convex) transformation of $f_2$ if there is an increasing and concave (convex) function $v$ such that $f_1 = v \circ f_2$.

**Proposition 5** Assume that $u$ has convex absolute risk aversion. Then, if $\hat{c}$ is a concave transformation of $l$, then $c$ is a concave transformation of $l$. Conversely, if $c$ is a convex transformation of $l$, then $\hat{c}$ has the same property.

**Proof.** Recall that we have

$$
g_\lambda (c(y)) = 1 + \mu l(y, e_0), \quad (12)$$

$$
\hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi} (\hat{c}(y)) = 1 + \hat{\mu} l(y, e_0), \quad (13)
$$

where the functions $g_\lambda$ and $\hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi}$ are defined as in (10) and (11), respectively. First, suppose that $\hat{c}$ is a concave transformation of $l$. Since the right-hand side of (13) is a positive affine transformation of $l$, this implies that $\hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi}$ is convex. Now, notice that convexity of $\hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi}$ implies that $g_\lambda (c) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \hat{g}_{\lambda, \xi}(c) + \xi a(c) \right)$ is convex as well (since $a(c)$ is convex by assumption). Hence, using (12), we see that $c$ is a concave transformation of $l$. 

12
Conversely, suppose that $c$ is a convex transformation of $l$. Using (12), we see that $g_\lambda$ is then concave. Convexity of $a(c)$ implies that $\hat{g}_{\lambda,\xi}$ is then also concave, which shows that $\hat{c}$ is a convex transformation of $l$. Q.E.D.

The previous finding induces an ordering that has the flavor of $c$ being ‘more concave’ than $\hat{c}$. Note that this result generalizes Proposition 4 to arbitrary shapes of the likelihood ratio function $l$. As a drawback, we can rank the curvature of $c$ and $\hat{c}$ only when, for example, $c$ is more concave than $l$. We will now reduce the set of possible utility functions to facilitate such comparisons.

Let us consider the class of HARA (or linear risk tolerance) utility functions, namely

$$u(c) = \rho \left( \eta + \frac{c}{\gamma} \right)^{1-\gamma}$$

with $\rho \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} > 0$, and $\eta + \frac{c}{\gamma} > 0$.

For this class, we have $a(c) = \left( \eta + \frac{c}{\gamma} \right)^{-1}$. Hence, absolute risk aversion is convex. Special cases of the HARA class are CRRA, CARA, and quadratic utility (e.g., see Gollier 2001).

**Lemma** Given a utility function $u : C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, consider the two functions defined as follows:

$$g_\lambda (c) := \frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c)},$$

$$\hat{g}_{\lambda,\xi} (c) := \frac{\lambda q}{\beta u'(c)} - \hat{\xi} a(c).$$

Then, if $u$ belongs to the HARA class with $\gamma \geq -1$, then $\hat{g}_{\lambda,\xi}$ is a concave transformation of $g_\lambda$ for all $\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi} \geq 0, \lambda > 0$.

**Proof.** If $u$ belongs to the HARA class, we obtain

$$\hat{g}_{\lambda,\xi}(c) = \frac{\hat{\lambda}}{\lambda} g_\lambda(c) - \hat{\xi} a(c) = \frac{\hat{\lambda}}{\lambda} g_\lambda(c) - \hat{\xi} \lambda^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \kappa (g_\lambda(c))^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

with $\kappa = \left[ \frac{\gamma q}{\beta \rho (1-\gamma)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} > 0$.

In other words, we have

$$\hat{g}_{\lambda,\xi}(c) = h(g_\lambda(c)), \text{ where } h(g) = \frac{\hat{\lambda}}{\lambda} g - \hat{\xi} \lambda^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \kappa g^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}.$$

The second derivative of $h$ with respect to $g$ is $-\frac{\hat{\xi} \lambda^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \kappa}{\gamma} \left( \frac{1}{\gamma} + 1 \right) g^{-\frac{1}{\gamma} - 2}$, which is negative whenever $\gamma \geq -1$. Q.E.D.
The restriction $\gamma \geq -1$ in the above result is innocuous and allows for all HARA functions with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion as well as quadratic utility, for instance. To state the consequences of this Lemma, we introduce the concept of $G$-convexity (e.g., see Avriel et al., 1988), which is widely used in optimization. A function $f$ is $G$-convex if once we transform $f$ with $G$ we get a convex function. More formally:

**Definition 3** Let $f$ be a function and $G$ an increasing function mapping from the image of $f$ to the real numbers. The function $f$ is called $G$-convex ($G$-concave) if $G \circ f$ is a convex (concave) function.

This concept generalizes the standard notion of convexity. It is easy to see that a function $f$ is convex if and only if it is $G$-convex for any increasing affine function $G$. Moreover, it can be shown that if $G$ is concave and $f$ is $G$-convex then $f$ must be convex, but the converse is false.\(^{10}\)

**Proposition 6** Assume $u$ belongs to the HARA class with $\gamma \geq -1$. Then $c$ is $g_{\lambda}$-convex ($g_{\lambda}$-concave) if and only if $\hat{c}$ is $\hat{g}_{\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi}}$-convex ($\hat{g}_{\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi}}$-concave).\(^{11}\)

**Proof.** Recall that consumption is determined as follows:

\[
g_{\lambda} (c(y)) = 1 + \mu l(y, e_0),
\]

\[
\hat{g}_{\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi}} (\hat{c}(y)) = 1 + \hat{\mu} l(y, e_0).
\]

As a consequence, we can relate the two consumption functions as follows:

\[
\frac{1}{\mu} \left( g_{\lambda} (c(y)) - 1 \right) = \frac{1}{\hat{\mu}} \left( \hat{g}_{\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi}} (\hat{c}(y)) - 1 \right).
\]  

(14)

Now the result follows from the simple fact that convexity/concavity is preserved under positive affine transformations. Q.E.D.

**Corollary** If $\hat{c}$ is $g_{\lambda}$-concave then $c$ is $g_{\lambda}$-concave. Conversely, if $c$ is $g_{\lambda}$-convex then $\hat{c}$ is $g_{\lambda}$-convex.

\(^{10}\)For example, suppose $f(x) = x^2$ and $G(\cdot) = \log(\cdot)$, then $G(f(x)) = 2 \log(x)$, which is obviously not convex.

\(^{11}\)In fact, this statement is not only true for concavity and convexity, but more generally for any property defined with respect to the transformations $g_{\lambda}$ and $\hat{g}_{\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\xi}}$. 

14
Proof. Let \( \hat{c} \) be \( g_\lambda \)-concave. By the Lemma, we have \( \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} = h \circ g_\lambda \) for some increasing and concave function \( h \). Hence, when \( \hat{c} \) is \( g_\lambda \)-concave, then \( \hat{c} \) must also be \( \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} \)-concave. Now Proposition 6 implies that \( c \) is \( g_\lambda \)-concave.

To verify the second statement, let \( c \) be \( g_\lambda \)-convex. From Proposition 6, we see that \( \hat{c} \) is \( \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} \)-convex, i.e., \( \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} \circ \hat{c} \) is convex. By the Lemma, we have \( \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} = h \circ g_\lambda \) for some increasing and concave function \( h \). Since the inverse of \( h \) must be convex, we conclude that \( g_\lambda \circ \hat{c} = h^{-1} \circ \hat{g}_\lambda \hat{\xi} \circ \hat{c} \) is convex.

Q.E.D.

The corollary shows that whenever \( \hat{c} \) satisfies the \( g_\lambda \)-concavity property, then \( c \) satisfies this property. In this sense, we note again that \( c \) is ‘more concave’ than \( \hat{c} \).

Finally, it appears natural to ask whether the concavity of \( c \) and \( \hat{c} \) can also be ranked according to the concavity notion of Definition 2. In other words, can we conclude that \( c \) is a concave transformation of \( \hat{c} \) for HARA utility with \( \gamma \geq -1 \)? In general, the answer is negative. After a small modification of the above lemma, it can be shown that there exists a concave function \( \tilde{h} \) such that \( c \) and \( \hat{c} \) are related as follows:

\[
c(y) = \tilde{g}^{-1} \circ \tilde{h} \circ \tilde{g}(\hat{c}(y)),
\]

where \( \tilde{g}(c) = \frac{\lambda q}{u'(c)} - 1 \) is increasing. If \( \tilde{g} \) is an affine function (\( u \) is logarithmic utility), then one can easily verify that the composition \( \tilde{g}^{-1} \circ \tilde{h} \circ \tilde{g} \) is concave whenever \( \tilde{h} \) is concave. For the logarithmic case, \( c \) is hence a concave transformation of \( \hat{c} \). In general, however, we cannot be sure that the composition \( \tilde{g}^{-1} \circ \tilde{h} \circ \tilde{g} \) is concave when \( \tilde{h} \) is concave.\(^{12}\)

5 Conclusion and outlook

This paper analyzes how capital taxation changes the optimal tax code on labor income. Whenever preferences exhibit convex absolute risk aversion, we find that optimal consumption changes in a ‘more concave’ way with labor income when the bond is taxed. In this sense, labor income taxes become more progressive when capital is taxed.

\(^{12}\)Consider the following example: \( \hat{g}(c) = \exp(c) \) for \( c > 0 \), \( \hat{h}(x) = (x + d)^\alpha \) for \( x > 0 \), with \( 0 < \alpha < 1, \ d > 0 \). Then \( \hat{h}(x) \) is concave in \( x \), but \( \hat{g}^{-1} \circ \hat{h} \circ \hat{g}(c) = \alpha \log(\exp(c) + d) \) is convex in \( c \).
The theoretical results derived above are rigorous, but have a few drawbacks. For future research, we thus plan to perform some quantitative exercises to provide a more precise understanding of the above findings. In particular, we plan to estimate the likelihood ratio function from the model. This will show whether the assumptions made, for instance, in Propositions 4 and 5 are likely to be satisfied in the data. Moreover, we want to explore within a concrete counterfactual how much capital taxation changes the curvature of labor income taxes from a quantitative point of view. Specifically, we aim at comparing the shape of labor income taxes under the existing capital tax code with the shape under the optimal code.

In addition, quantitative explorations will allow for the study of alternative progressivity measures. While the theoretical part of this paper has focused on the marginal tax rate, progressivity can also be defined with respect to the average tax rate as in Sadka (1976). It may also be interesting to consider some alternative measures of progressivity, such as the progressivity wedge discussed in Guvenen et al. (2009).\textsuperscript{13} Finally, quantitative explorations will highlight the welfare implications of capital taxation in our model. Obviously, capital taxation is welfare-increasing in the present framework, since it reduces the insurance value of asset accumulation. The magnitude of this effect is not evident, however.

On a more general level, some further extensions of the model could be useful for future research. First of all, the study of assets different from the bond might highlight the boundaries of the present findings. Secondly, it might be interesting to see how the impact of capital taxation changes when there is a desire for ex-ante redistribution.

\textsuperscript{13}Guvenen et al. (2009) define the progressivity wedge as follows:

\[
\frac{c_{s+1}}{y_{s+1}} - \frac{c_s}{y_s}.
\]

When income is continuous, the corresponding expression is:

\[
-\frac{d}{dy} \log \frac{c(y)}{y} = -\frac{d}{dy} [\log c(y) - \log y] = \frac{1}{y} - \frac{c'(y)}{c(y)}.
\]
References


