Uniformly sized constituencies give voters similar influence on election outcomes. When constituencies are set up, seats are allocated to the administrative units, such as states or counties, using apportionment methods. According to the impossibility result of Balinski and Young, none of the methods satisfying basic monotonicity properties assign a rounded proportional number of seats (the Hare-quota). We study the malapportionment of constituencies and provide a simple bound as a function of the house size for an important class of divisor methods, a popular, monotonic family of techniques.
Venue: Budapest, Fővám tér 8. 1093 The Financial Research Centre, Department of Finance, Corvinus Business School, Corvinus University of Budapest and the Game Theory Research Group, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, ... Details »
Venue: Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (CERS IE-HAS), 1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán u. 4. Ground Floor room K 11-12. Thursday, 14 November, 2019 9:00 Imre Fertő (CERS IE/KU): Introduction Efficiency 9:10 J. Stephen Clark (Dalhousie University) and Lukas Cechura (Czech University of Life ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem The Cost of Favouritism in Public Procurement Bruno Baránek Department of Economics, Princeton University Vítézslav Titl Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Leuven ... Details »
“PARENTAL JOB LOSS, SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION AND HOME ENVIRONMENT” by Tamás HAJDU, Gábor KERTESI and Gábor KÉZDI was published in Acta Oeconomica. Abstract This ... Details »
Trading Networks with Frictions by Tamás FLEINER, Ravi JAGADEESAN, Zsuzsanna JANKÓ and Alexander TEYTELBOYM was published in Econometrica. download article here Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
“The multiplier effect of local food: the protocol of a systematic review” was presented by Imre FERTŐ at the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural ... Details »