We study monotonicity properties of solutions to the classic problem of fair cake-cutting—dividing a heterogeneous resource among agents with different preferences. Resource- and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where the cake, or the number of participants who divide the cake, changes. It is required that the utility of all participants change in the same direction: either all of them are better-off (if there is more to share or fewer to share among) or all are worse-off (if there is less to share or more to share among). We formally introduce these concepts to the cake-cutting setting and show that they are violated by common division rules. In contrast, we prove that the Nash-optimal rule—maximizing the product of utilities—is resource-monotonic and population-monotonic, in addition to being Pareto-optimal, envy-free and satisfying a strong competitive-equilibrium condition. Moreover, we prove that it is the only rule among a natural family of welfare-maximizing rules that is both proportional and resource-monotonic.
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K013-14-es előadóterem Ride-share matching algorithms generate income inequality Eszter Bokányi and Anikó Hannák Abstract Despite the potential of online sharing economy platforms such as Uber, Lyft, ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem Kiss Hubert János: Coopetition in group contest https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MTDP1911.pdf Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
“Opinion leaders – experts of social relations” was presented by Balázs SZIKLAI at the EURO2019 – 30th European Conference on Operational Research. Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
Download “Coopetition in group contest” by Hubert János Kiss – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia – Vita Zhukova here. Abstract There are situations in which competitors ally ... Details »
Ata Atay‘s two recent workings papers have been published and are accessible at the following links: A bargaining set for roommate ... Details »