We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
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Kiss Hubert János: Coopetition in group contest https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MTDP1911.pdf Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter