We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem The Cost of Favouritism in Public Procurement Bruno Baránek Department of Economics, Princeton University Vítézslav Titl Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Leuven ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K013-14-es előadóterem Dissecting the Gender Gap in Entrepreneurial Ambitions and Success Békés Gábor, Hannák Anikó, May Anna Despite the growing number of women-owned businesses, women still ... Details »
“PARENTAL JOB LOSS, SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION AND HOME ENVIRONMENT” by Tamás HAJDU, Gábor KERTESI and Gábor KÉZDI was published in Acta Oeconomica. Abstract This ... Details »
Trading Networks with Frictions by Tamás FLEINER, Ravi JAGADEESAN, Zsuzsanna JANKÓ and Alexander TEYTELBOYM was published in Econometrica. download article here Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
“The multiplier effect of local food: the protocol of a systematic review” was presented by Imre FERTŐ at the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural ... Details »