In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their types. These two requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment problem, both involving some distributional constraints. We used integer programming techniques to find reasonably good solutions with regard to the stability and the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college admissions with affirmative action.
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem The Cost of Favouritism in Public Procurement Bruno Baránek Department of Economics, Princeton University Vítézslav Titl Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Leuven ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K013-14-es előadóterem Dissecting the Gender Gap in Entrepreneurial Ambitions and Success Békés Gábor, Hannák Anikó, May Anna Despite the growing number of women-owned businesses, women still ... Details »
“PARENTAL JOB LOSS, SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION AND HOME ENVIRONMENT” by Tamás HAJDU, Gábor KERTESI and Gábor KÉZDI was published in Acta Oeconomica. Abstract This ... Details »
Trading Networks with Frictions by Tamás FLEINER, Ravi JAGADEESAN, Zsuzsanna JANKÓ and Alexander TEYTELBOYM was published in Econometrica. download article here Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
“The multiplier effect of local food: the protocol of a systematic review” was presented by Imre FERTŐ at the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural ... Details »