In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their types. These two requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment problem, both involving some distributional constraints. We used integer programming techniques to find reasonably good solutions with regard to the stability and the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college admissions with affirmative action.
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem We study the impact of monetary conditions on the supply of mortgage credit by banks to households. Using comprehensive credit register data from Hungary, ... Details »
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem TBA Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K011-12-es előadóterem We use household budget data (HKÉF) for 2013-2017 to: quantify the magnitudes of permanent and transitory income shocks of Hungarian households with a working ... Details »
Does politicizing ‘gender’ influence the possibility of conducting academic research? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial by Tünde LÉNÁRD, Daniel HORN and Hubert János ... Details »
“PARENTAL JOB LOSS, SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION AND HOME ENVIRONMENT” by Tamás HAJDU, Gábor KERTESI and Gábor KÉZDI was published in Acta Oeconomica. Abstract This ... Details »
Trading Networks with Frictions by Tamás FLEINER, Ravi JAGADEESAN, Zsuzsanna JANKÓ and Alexander TEYTELBOYM was published in Econometrica. download article here Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter