In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their types. These two requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment problem, both involving some distributional constraints. We used integer programming techniques to find reasonably good solutions with regard to the stability and the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college admissions with affirmative action.
Venue: MTA HTK 1097 Budapest Tóth Kálmán u. 4. fszt. K0.11-12 Célzott K&F adókedvezmény hatása termékpiaci verseny esetén A legtöbb országban az adótörvények lehetőséget biztosítanak a cégek számára, hogy k&f tevékenységükhöz kapcsolódóan adóalap-kedvezményt, és adott esetben ... Details »
Venue: MTA Humán Tudományok Kutatóháza, 1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán utca 4. földszinti K11-12. sz. előadóterem Neszveda Gábor (Corvinus) Aspiration Level, Probability of Success, and Stock Returns: An Empirical Test The probability of achieving the aspiration level, i.e., the probability ... Details »
“Zero-rating and Net Neutrality” was presented by Róbert SOMOGYI at the 24th Spring Meeting of Young Economists in Brussels. conference website Share this:FacebookLinkedInTwitter
“Foreign-owned firms as agents of structural change in regions” by Zoltán ELEKES, Ron BOSCHMA and Balázs LENGYEL was published in Regional Studies. download open access version ... Details »
Wage Structure, Employment and Efficiency was presented by Balázs REIZER at the Royal Economic Society 2019 Annual Conference. conference website Abstract: I document new facts ... Details »