Megjelent Biró Péter cikke a European Journal of Operational Research tudományos lapban

Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare

Abstract

We allocate objects to agents as exemplified primarily by school choice. Welfare judgments of the object-allocating agency are encoded as edge weights in the acceptability graph. The welfare of an allocation is the sum of its edge weights. We introduce the constrained welfare-maximizing solution, which is the allocation of highest welfare among the Pareto-efficient allocations. We identify conditions under which this solution is easily determined from a computational point of view. For the unrestricted case, we formulate an integer program and find this to be viable in practice as it quickly solves a real-world instance of kindergarten allocation and large-scale simulated instances. Incentives to report preferences truthfully are discussed briefly.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221720302320?fbclid=IwAR3tHI9meDwq0F896ZtbTJM3VEk8T90AWeRy5fQYAC5BzS544AwICyhHuVo

Felhasználási feltételek
Impresszum
Intézményünk országos és nemzetközi hálózati kapcsolatát az NIIF program biztosítja
Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet
© Copyright 2019. Minden jog fenntartva.